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 This paper evaluates the catalysts and drivers of speculative bubbles from a historical 
perspective. This analysis aims to identify the indicators of speculative bubbles that are 
commonly present across historical and modern economic bubbles, and to evaluate 
whether these indicators are present in potential bubble-forming economies. The first 
section focuses on the theoretical framework of bubble formation under the following 
dominating theories: self-fulfilling expectation theory, Greater Fool Theory and the Positive 
Feedback Approach. The first section is followed by a detailed narration of historical bubbles 
which highlight the factors that contribute to the creation, propagation and bursting of asset 
bubbles. Next, these historical cases are compared in order to determine the key catalysts and 
drivers of bubble formation. Based on the qualitative analysis of bubble formation, the 
relationship between present price change, fundamentals and past price behavior is tested using a 
pooled regression technique. Concluding remarks will discuss the overall implications of this 
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Section I: Introduction 
 In a rational market, the occurrence of speculative asset price bubbles would be 
non-existent. Perfectly competitive markets with full information about the future would 
be perfectly efficient. Furthermore, market prices would be indicative of the fundamental 
value of assets and the level of risk associated with them. Fundamental value is a measure 
of the intrinsic economic value of an asset, which can be measured by indicators such as 
the asset’s future dividend stream adjusted for inflation or price-to-earnings ratios (P/E 
ratio), along with a premium for the level of risk (Flood & Garber, 1980; Li & Chand, 
2015; Tirole, 1982). Due to the presence of these efficient market conditions, the 
economy would maintain a stabilized market which would not propagate the chance of 
speculative behavior. However, in reality, market participants do not have access to 
perfect information. As a result, the level of risk, future prices and inflation are unknown 
factors. Under these conditions, investors will base their valuation of assets on their 
expectations. The tendency of investors to base investment decisions on expectations and 
their potential to stray from the fundamental value of an asset can give rise to speculative 
behavior and act as a catalyst in the development of a speculative asset bubble (Siegel, 
2003). 
 This paper focuses its attention on the study of historical and modern speculative 
bubbles. Characteristically, bubbles form due to the trend-chasing behavior of market 
participants. That is, during the development of an irrational bubble, investors make 
investment decisions without considering all existing fundamental information (Siegel, 
2003). Traditionally, economists propose that the potential factors that contribute to the 





psychology (Chang, Newman, Walters and Wills, 2016; Mackay, 1996). However, over 
the past few decades, asset price bubbles have facilitated destructive banking crises, 
which have shifted the focus of the potential factors that develop irrational bubbles. In the 
current anatomy of irrational bubbles, it is argued that lax regulations, risky financial 
innovations, excessive risking-taking by financial institutions and loose monetary policy 
are the leading catalysts in the development of speculative asset bubbles (Roy & Kemme, 
2012). The emergence of modern speculative asset bubbles has fueled a debate amongst 
economists concerning the primary factors that contribute to the development of 
speculative bubbles.  
 Although extensive research has been conducted on the development of historical 
bubbles, the rise of modern economic bubbles in emerging economies has facilitated the 
need the reevaluate the common factors that lead to the development of speculative 
bubbles. Thus, this paper aims to identify the catalysts of bubbles that are commonly 
present across historical and modern economic bubbles and to evaluate whether 
these catalysts are present in potential bubble-forming markets. Section II details the 
theoretical development of speculative bubbles according to the dominating theories of 
economics: self-fulfilling expectation theory, Greater Fool Theory, and the Positive 
Feedback Approach. Sections III and IV provide a narration of the creation, propagation 
and bursting of famous early bubbles and modern bubbles. Based on the observed 
catalysts of speculative bubbles in sections III and IV, section V determines the key 
catalysts and drivers of bubble formation. Section VI qualitatively examines the presence 
of the outlined catalysts and drivers in the potential bubble-forming markets of emerging 





housing market of the United States from 1977-2016 by evaluating the relationship 
between present price change, fundamental indicators and past price change. Lastly, 
section VIII provides concluding remarks regarding the overall discoveries of this 
























Section II: The Theory of Bubbles  
This section focuses on developing the theoretical framework of bubble formation 
in the economy. First, we will define the theoretical relationship between economic 
fundamentals and the development of speculative price bubbles based on the economic 
theory of self-fulfilling expectations. Second, we will discuss the essential components of 
the Greater Fool Theory and how it contributes to the development of a plausible 
speculative asset price bubble. Third, by focusing on the field of behavioral finance, this 
discussion will highlight how the positive feedback approach and past price behavior 
promote the development of speculative bubbles. The main objective of this section is to 
provide a presentation of the dominating theories behind the propagation of speculative 
price bubbles.  
2.1: Asset Price Fundamentals 
In the study of speculative asset price bubbles, the economic theory of self-
fulfilling expectations is considered a dominating theory behind the creation of bubbles 
(Tirole, 1982). Based on this theory, the valuation of an asset is not only determined by a 
market participant’s valuation of an asset based on economic fundamentals, but also is 
reflective of the market participant’s speculative behavior. The difference between the 
market price and the economic fundamentals, which is the valuation of an asset based on 
speculative behavior, is called a “bubble” (Flood & Garber, 1980; Li & Chand, 2015; 
Tirole, 1982). The speculative behavior of multiple market participants gives rise to the 
propagation of bubbles. While the existence of speculative price bubbles is controversial, 





South-Sea Bubble, the Railway Mania, the Baburu Keiki of Japan in the late 1980s, the 
Dotcom Bubble in the late 1990s and the U.S. Housing Bubble. 
 The valuation of an asset that is solely based on economic fundamentals needs to 
be determined in order to establish the value of the asset that exceeds fundamentals. 
When studying the existence of speculative bubbles, the difficulty that arises in 
determining the valuation of economic fundamentals is what causes debate over the 
existence of bubbles. In part, the existence of bubbles is controversial because the 
valuation of fundamentals is uncertain (Flood & Garber, 1980). One can define economic 
fundamentals as the discounted future cash flows from an asset based on the rational 
expectation of that asset’s performance. The fundamental value of an asset can be 
calculated by discounting the future earnings stream of the asset along with the future 
ending value (Li & Chand, 2015; Tirole, 1982). If E0 is declared but not received yet, and 
r is constant, the calculation of fundamentals can be represented in the following manner: 















In the formula above, NPV refers to net present value, which is an investment measure 
that compares the present value of future discounted earnings stream to the amount 
invested today. The variable “Ei” is the expected cash inflow of the defined period.  The 
discount rate is defined by the variable “r”, and  “r” is constant. The variable “i” is the 
time period for which the NPV is being calculated for. However, if we assume that the 
dividend growth rate is constant, then the following can be stated: 

















In the equation above, “g” denotes the dividend growth rate of the asset. As stated before, 
the price of an asset should represent the value of the asset based on economic 
fundamentals. Therefore, if NPV captures the discounted future earnings stream of an 
asset then, the following can be written: 
𝑃0 = 𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝐸) 
           𝑃0 = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝑥
𝑖 
The previous equation uses “P0” to represent the current price of the asset. If the previous 
equation is represented using an infinite series, then the following results: 
If g < r, then x < 1 and the following is true, 




























By replacing ∑ 𝑥𝑖  with 
1
𝑟−𝑔
, the following is obtained: 














According to this equation, the P/E ratio and 
1
𝑟−𝑔
 share an inverse relationship. 
That is, a decrease in the difference of the rate of return and the dividend growth rate 
induces an overall increase in the P/E ratio. The relationship that is derived between NPV 
and the current price of an asset is the principle reason why investors use the P/E ratio as 
a measure to dictate their investment decisions.  
Also, the discount rate is composed of two variables—safe interest rate and a risk 
premium. If r* is the safe interest and 𝜎 is the risk premium, then the equation above can 





𝑟∗ + 𝜎 − 𝑔
 
As suggested by the equation above, the P/E ratio, the safe interest rate and the risk 
premium share an inverse relationship. That is, a perceived decrease in risk or interest 
rate will increase the P/E ratio. On the other hand, if people expect an increase in the 
dividends growth rate, then the P/E ratio will also increase. Bubbles will form in the 
market when market agents make investment decisions based on the assumption that past 
increases in the P/E ratio will continue in future P/E ratios.     
 However, as suggested by the definition of economic fundamentals, there are two 
unknown variables that are used to capture the value of economic fundamentals. First, the 
rational expectation of an asset’s performance is an unknown variable. Due to the 
complexity of determining all the inputs that account for the future price of an asset, there 
is no way to establish the rational expectations of an asset’s performance. There are 
simply too many variables affecting the valuation of an asset’s future price to correctly 





income stream of an asset (Tirole, 1982). The second unknown factor in calculating the 
value of economic fundamentals is the discount to apply to the future cash flows. In order 
to determine the discount rate, market participants must estimate the future rate of 
inflation. Similar to the difficulties experienced while estimating the future price of an 
asset, there are too many variables affecting the future rate of inflation. The inherent 
uncertainties in estimating the future income stream and discount rate are the reasons 
behind the debate over the existence of speculative bubbles.  
  Although the true value of economic fundamentals is difficult to determine, 
economists model the value of economic fundamentals through proxy variables. Such 
proxy variables include disposable income, population, GDP growth rate, unemployment, 
interest rates and inflation (Li & Chand, 2015; Flood & Garber, 1980). Once a set of 
proxy variables is established to model economic fundamentals, the next step is to 
determine the mechanism that gives rise to speculative behavior and allows asset prices 
to deviate from fundamental—propagating speculative bubbles.  
When following the path of bubble development, the initial period of bubble 
formation is characterized by large price increases that can be justified by economic 
fundamentals. However, market participants anticipate larger increases in future prices, 
which do occur due to the self-fulfilling expectations of market participants. As explained 
before, the additional valuation of the asset that is not justified by economic fundamentals 
is based upon the speculative behavior of market participants. The additional price 
movement that is explained by speculative behavior is what causes the formation of 
bubbles (Flood & Garber, 1980; Li & Chand, 2015; Tirole, 1982). As market prices 





of new information and the rational decision-making of other participants. Eventually, 
market agents grow weary of the price increases because the valuation of the assets is not 
justified by economic fundamentals, and participants begin to withdraw from the market. 
The bursting of the bubble occurs when the expected price movements quickly disappears 
and begins to plummet, causing a crash in the market.  
2.2: Greater Fool Theory 
Another popularized theory in the discussion of the development of speculative 
price bubbles is the Greater Fool Theory. Asset price bubbles arise when market prices 
deviate from the fundamental value of assets. The difference between the market price 
and the economic fundamentals, which is the valuation of an asset based on speculative 
behavior, is called a “bubble” (Flood & Garber, 1980; Li & Chand, 2015; Tirole, 1982). 
According to John Maynard Keynes’ (1936) Greater Fool Theory, the market price of an 
asset is not primarily based on economic fundamentals, but is determined by the market’s 
irrational beliefs and expectations. The primary premise of the Greater Fool Theory is 
that agents are willing to pay more for an asset, despite knowing the low fundamental 
value of the asset, because agents anticipate selling the asset to someone else for a higher 
price (Keynes, 1936; Barlevy, 2015). While scrutinizing this theory, people commonly 
have one primary question. Why would someone be willing to buy an asset despite 
knowing its low fundamental value? 
To answer this question, it is important to understand the concepts of speculative 
trading and asymmetric information and how they function within the Greater Fool 
Theory. By definition, a market agent who participates in speculative trading expects to 





mutually benefitting gains. Within the framework of the Greater Fool Theory, speculative 
trading describes the reasoning behind the agent’s willingness to purchase an asset with 
low fundamental value. Despite knowing the low fundamental value of an asset, an agent 
is willing to buy an asset at a high price because of the belief that the asset can be sold to 
a “greater fool.” In this case, the agent anticipates gaining a profit at the expense of 
someone else (Barlevy, 2015). 
In addition to speculative trading, asymmetric information is a key feature of the 
Greater Fool Theory. Asymmetric information suggests that specific market participants 
have access to private information other participants may not be aware of. When this 
concept is applied to the Greater Fool Theory, agents are willing to buy an asset below 
fundamental value due to the possibility of selling the asset to a less informed agent 
(Barlevy, 2015). Asymmetric information is a fundamental component of the 
development of speculative bubbles because the access to new information influences a 
trader’s decision to sell, hold or buy an asset.  
As described before, the initial period of bubble development is characterized by 
large price increases that can be justified by fundamentals. However, in the presence of 
asymmetric information and speculative trading, market participants anticipate larger 
price increases that are not justified by economic fundamentals. The Greater Fool Theory 
argues that asymmetric information and speculative trading activity will influence traders 
to buy assets with low fundamental value and sell the assets to a less-informed agent at a 
higher price (Barlevy, 2015). As this cycle of speculative trading continues, the price of 
assets superficially continues to rise and deviate from fundamental value. The additional 





Garber, 1980; Li & Chand, 2015; Tirole, 1982). Eventually, market participants realize 
that the price increase is not justified by economic fundamentals and decide to withdraw 
from the market. The bubble bursts when expected price movement disappears and 
begins to plummet because information regarding the worth of the asset is available to all 
traders.  
2.3: Positive Feedback Investment Strategy—Past Price Behavior 
 In recent years, economists have shifted their focus to behavioral finance as a 
plausible field of study to explain the propagation of speculative bubbles. Behavioral 
finance emphasizes the psychological forces that influence investor behavior. Within the 
sphere of behavioral finance, the approach of “positive feedback” trading is central to the 
development of speculative bubbles. According to this approach, traders have a tendency 
to exhibit trend chasing behavior because positive feedback traders are more inclined to 
buy assets as prices rise and sell when prices fall. Positive feedback trading is commonly 
practiced in financial markets such as stop loss orders, margin call liquidation, portfolio 
insurance, and most prominently in extrapolative expectations. Although all of these 
trading strategies are as equally as important, we will primarily focus on how past price 
changes influence extrapolative expectations and lead to large fluctuations in the value of 
traded assets (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990).  
 One of the most highlighted aspects of positive feedback trading is the trend-
chasing tendency of traders, which is influenced by past price changes. De Long et al. 
(1990) report a psychological experiment in which subjects were asked to forecast stock 
price changes and perform trades consistent with their forecasts. In the study, the subjects 





stock except for information regarding past prices. It was found that the participants 
calculated past price averages when the stock prices were stable and traded against price 
variations. As the past prices began to show consistent patterns, traders exhibited trend-
chasing behavior, buying more when prices increased and selling when prices decreased. 
 In a similar experiment, Shiller (2002) draws identical conclusion as De Long 
and his colleagues. According to his investigation, many psychological factors, such as 
intuition, feelings of confidence and self-esteem from past successes in investing and the 
personal association with price increases, encouraged people to expect past price changes 
to continue in the future. As prices begin to show consistent trends, positive feedback 
traders will indefinitely buy more when prices increase and sell when prices decrease; 
hence, contributing to the deviation of assets from their fundamental value.  
 Positive feedback trading creates the perfect conditions for the development of 
speculative price bubbles, because of the level of risk and uncertainty that is associated 
with this trading strategy. As discussed in the paragraph above, feedback traders make 
trading decisions based on extrapolated trends of past price changes (De Long et al., 
1990; Shiller, 2002). This strategy of decision-making involves a great level of risk 
because of the uncertainty related to whether future prices will continue to follow the 
trend. Furthermore, based on the historical occurrence of bubbles and crashes, bubbles 
have significantly reduced since World War I. Due to this knowledge of bubble 
infrequency, trend chasing agents will only have the opportunity of learning about the 
error of their decision once the bubble has occurred. If the trend chasing agents’ 





their short trend horizons to longer trend horizons and therefore, sustain rising prices and 
a bubble that is not justified by fundamentals (De Long et al., 1990).  
 The theoretical framework of bubble formation provides three dominate theories 
that describe the development of bubbles. According to the self-fulfilling expectations 
theory, the valuation of an asset is not only determined by a market participant’s 
valuation of an asset based on economic fundamentals, but also is reflective of the market 
participant’s speculative behavior. The difference between the market price and the 
economic fundamentals is called a bubble (Flood & Garber, 1980; Li & Chand, 2015; 
Tirole, 1982). Additionally, the Greater Fool Theory suggests that agents are willing to 
pay more for an asset, despite knowing the low fundamental value of the asset, because 
agents anticipate selling the asset to someone else for a higher price. In the presence of 
asymmetric information and speculative trading, market participants buy assets with low 
fundamental value and sell the assets to a less-informed agent (Keynes, 1936; Barlevy, 
2015). Furthermore, the positive feedback approach describes the tendency of market 
agents to make trading decisions based on extrapolated trends of past price changes (De 
Long et al., 1990; Shiller 2002). Based on the analysis of the theoretical framework of 
bubble development, it is evident that bubbles form when market agents use past 
information to make present investment decisions rather than the new information that is 









Section III: Famous Early Bubbles 
Speculative asset price bubbles are not a recent phenomenon. History provides an 
array of examples of how asset prices can deviate from their fundamental values and give 
rise to bubble economies. Through the investigation of historic bubbles, we will gain a 
clearer understanding of speculative asset price bubbles. A historical review of bubbles 
will assist in recognizing the leading indicators of an economy prone to speculative 
behavior and plausible policies that will help prevent the development of bubbles. 
 3.1: Tulip Mania (1634-1637)—Netherlands 
The Netherlands experienced the first formally recognized creation, propagation, 
and consequent crash of a bubble in the tulip market during the seventeenth century. In 
the late sixteenth century, the tulip was first introduced in Western Europe by Conrad 
Gesner, and it quickly became a symbol of economic and social status for merchants 
(Mackay, 1996). Tulip bulbs were a prized asset because of the difficulty in acquiring the 
bulbs due to limited number of professional growers. 
However, after 1634, the price of tulips rose dramatically. As noted by Garber 
(1990), the dramatic increase in tulip prices was primarily accredited to the effects of the 
Mosaic virus on tulip bulbs. The Mosaic virus weakened the reproductive cycle of the 
plant. As an effect of its weakened state, tulips were subject to a phenomenon called 
“breaking,” which produced remarkable multicolored patterns on the flowers. With 
introduction of these infected bulbs in the market, prices for tulip bulbs rose to 
unprecedented levels. Not only did the multicolored species increase in price but in 
general, bulbs increased by approximately eightfold between 1634 and 1636 (Garber, 





At the same time, an individual could purchase four fat oxen for 480 florins or 1000lbs of 
cheese for 120 florins (Mackay, 1996). Investors were willing to invest in the tulip 
market based on the potential of the rare tulips to increase in fundamental value. 
However, as prices continued to rise, the price increase was not justified by an expected 
increase in the economic fundamentals of bulbs. Investors continued to irrationally invest 
in bulbs and actively ignored the price that the bulbs could demand based on 
fundamentals (Mackay, 1996). Chang et al. (2016) argue that the optimistic and 
speculative behavior of investors is the initial catalyst of the Tulip Mania. 
 The Tulip Mania contributed to the development of the futures market in the 
Netherlands. Due to the lack of readily available credit, bulbs were made accessible to the 
public through the deposit of goods such as livestock and property. Also, the seasonality 
of the tulip bulbs meant that sellers traded options1 on tulip bulb futures. The futures 
market further incentivized the public to trade tulip options which facilitated the 
development of the Tulip Mania. Traders made large profits by buying low and selling 
options when prices rose (Mackay, 1996). 
Also, traders optimistically inferred that affluent foreigners would purchase rare tulip 
bulbs regardless of price. This assumption was further solidified as the popularity of tulip 
bulbs continued to rise in the wealthy Dutch families (Chang et al., 2016). According to 
Chang et al. (2016), the over-estimation of the tulip bulb demand and the optimistic 
assumption of the traders regarding the demand from foreigners aided the development of 
the Tulip Mania.  
                                                          





 By early 1637, traders soon realized that people were not willing to invest in the 
high-priced tulip bulbs and the bubble economy began to crash. As prices and confidence 
fell in the tulip bulbs, individuals who had purchased expensive tulip bulb futures 
suffered immensely. Many investors who had made deposits on bulbs during the boom 
period failed to fulfill their commitments. Moreover, the government and the courts of 
Holland refused to intervene and legally enforce payment to depositors of bulb options, 
because trading of contracts was classified as gambling by the courts. Thus, public credit 
also collapsed (Mackay, 1996). It is often thought that bursts of bubble economies occur 
overnight. However, this thought is a misconception of the autonomy of speculative asset 
bubbles. In the case of the Tulip Mania, tulip prices steadily decreased over the next few 
years. As calculated by Garber (1990), the average annual decline in prices for these 
bulbs for the remainder of the century was approximately 28%. Although the initial 
decline of tulip prices is associated with the collapse of the asset price bubble, the gradual 
decline that persisted over the remainder of the century is related to the change in 
preferences and the technological advancement of society (Garber, 1990).   
3.2: The South Sea Bubble (1720s)—Britain 
 The South Sea Bubble represents the world’s first global financial bubble. The 
South Sea Bubble was fueled by the emergence of the South Sea Company, which was 
created by Hartley Earl of Oxford in 1711 as a method to provide funds to the British 
government following the War of the Spanish Succession (Garber, 1990). The structure 
of the arrangement was very similar to the one conducted by John Law in France with the 
Mississippi Company. Law proposed that to raise capital for a venture, entrepreneurs 





prices. The ability of the venture to generate revenue raised public confidence in the 
shares; hence, stabilizing the prices (Garber, 1990). The South Sea Company exemplified 
John Law’s rationality of one such venture. The company was effective in writing off the 
government debt with the methodology described by John Law (Chang et al., 2016). 
 Additionally, as a part of the agreement, the government granted the South Sea 
Company exclusive rights on trade via the “South Seas” and paid the company a 6% 
interest payment. However, British trade with South America was blocked by the Spanish 
because Spain controlled the eastern ports of South America (Garber, 1990). Although 
the South Sea Company maintained a limited monopoly, the promotion of the company’s 
monopoly on trade and the government decision to allow the company to set share prices 
independently on stock issues, further overstated share prices (Chang et al., 2016). The 
innovation of financial instruments to finance the debt of the government via corporate 
stock in the South Sea Company is a major factor that contributed to the development of 
the South Sea Bubble (Frehen, Goetzmann, & Rowenhorst, 2013). 
 Despite the South Sea Company’s limited monopoly, the South Sea Company 
maintained a strong public confidence. In 1717, George I, King of England, concerned 
with the state of public credit, suggested that Parliament take proper measure to reduce 
national debt. The South Sea Company and the Bank of England, being the great 
monetary corporations of the period, recognized the advantages of accepting a debt from 
the government—an interest payment of approximately 5% to the company and 
legislative support for limited competition (Mackay, 1996).  
After several attractive proposals made by both corporations, the House of 





of the South Sea Company, the value of company stock gradually rose from £130 to £330 
(Mackay, 1996). However, the acceptance of the South Sea Company’s proposal was 
highly controversial. Reportedly, members of the House of Commons and House of 
Lords owned stock in the South Sea Company. Due to their partiality towards the South 
Sea Company, the House of Commons and House of Lords deliberately voted on behalf 
of the Company. The support from the House of Commons and rumors of improved 
relations with Spain aided in raising the value of South Sea Company stock (Garber, 
1990; Mackay, 1996).    
In addition to the innovation of government finance, the South Sea Company also 
sold company shares as subscription shares to make the scheme appealing to more 
investors which aided in growing the valuation of shares. To buy subscription shares, 
investors were required to provide a down payment and schedule installments in order to 
get a certain number of shares. This scheme allowed the company to raise capital quickly 
(Chang et al., 2016). Shea (2007) argues that subscription shares were perceived as call 
options by owners. Although investors were obliged to pay for subscriptions, they had the 
option to default in the future if the subscription did not seem profitable (Shea, 2007). As 
described by Chang et al. (2016, p.498), “this would be a cost-effective strategy when the 
share price of the company was sufficiently below the price of the subscription, making 
the subscription a more expensive means of purchase.” Shea (2007) claims that the 
development of new financial instruments, such as the subscription shares allowed the 
bubble to expand as a wider audience was available to purchase the shares.  
The success of the South Sea Company encouraged the emergence of numerous 





the public, survived weeks and sometimes a few days, before their inflated stock prices 
collapsed. Accounts of these companies show that one company acquired approximately 
half a million in capital with the slogan, “A company for carrying on an undertaking of 
great advantage, but nobody to know what it is” (Mackay, 1996, p. 78). The frenzy 
amongst the crowd to gain riches allowed these companies to defraud the public.  
In the third quarter of 1720, the share prices of the South Sea Company 
significantly fell. The plummeting South Sea stock prices and the bursting of the South 
Sea Bubble occurred simultaneously. Many shareholders were unable to afford the 
subscription shares and defaulted, which reduced the cash flow from the subscription 
shares (Chang et al., 2016). Although the Company could set its own share prices, the 
willingness of the people to buy such high prices fell. As confidence fell in the South Sea 
Company, it diminished the interest of the public in similar joint-stock companies. 
Similar events were occurring internationally like the collapse of the Mississippi 
Company in France. This caused the share prices of the South Sea Company to fall even 
more (Frehen et al., 2013). The bursting of the South Sea Bubble was the result of the 
diminishing confidence of the pubic in the valuation of the South Sea Company, which 
triggered widespread speculation concerning the success of other joint-stock companies. 
As a result of the bursting of the South Sea Bubble, the Parliament of Great Britain 
enacted the Bubble Act, which restricted the trading of shares without the permission of 
the government and it acted as an instrument to control inflating share schemes (Frehen et 







3.3: The Railway Mania (1845-1847)—Britain 
 Shortly after the Industrial Revolution, a widespread enthusiasm for investing in 
railway shares promoted the British Railway Mania during the mid-1840s. The early 
success of railways as an effective method of transporting goods and passengers during 
the Industrial Revolution propagated the development of over 1,951 miles of railway 
tracks in Britain (Campbell, 2014). The Industrial Revolution created new wealth for 
middle-class families. This new-found wealth encouraged families to invest in the 
development of railway track and earn riches. The active participation of common people 
contributed to unique nature of the Railway Mania.  
Like the South Sea Bubble, as an effort to attract more investors, railway 
companies also offered subscription shares to potential investors. A few companies 
demanded 10% of the share’s value as a down payment, while reserving the right to 
demand the remaining 90% at any time (Chang et al., 2016). Campbell (2014) notes that 
the innovation of the subscription shares leveraged the returns which investors could 
obtain. That is, investors could produce a larger return on assets for a small deposit. The 
overwhelming success of the railway projects, the creation of new wealth, and the 
financial innovation of shares allowed middle-class families to invest in these schemes 
(Chang et al., 2016). Campbell (2014) and Chang et al. (2016) conclude that the investor 
speculation concerning the unexplored potential of railways and the financial innovation 
of share instruments were the two leading drivers of the Railway Mania.  
   In addition to the subscription shares and the creation of new wealth, the lack of 





annulment of the Bubble Act of 17202 allowed railway companies to sell shares without 
government supervision (McCartney & Arnold, 2003). Additionally, if Parliament had 
prohibited the use of partially-paid shares by requiring new projects to collect a larger 
share of the total cost of lines before the project was considered authorized, then this 
requirement would have reduced the effects of leverage on the investments (Campbell, 
2014). The annulment of the Bubble Act of 1720 and the lack of Parliament’s active 
participation in these investments contributed to the enhancement of the Railway Mania 
because, railway companies acted without any repercussions.  
 Despite the overwhelming excitement surrounding railways, the railway shares 
began to plummet by 1847, marking the collapse of the Railway Mania. There are two 
main reasons behind the burst of the Railway Bubble. First, the difficulty of constructing 
railways was realized once the construction of several rail projects began (Chang et al., 
2016). Second, the burst of the bubble is associated with the market realization that the 
technology of railways would not have the potential to sustain success as previously 
thought by investors (Chang et al., 2016). As a result, railway shares declined by 18.2% 
between their peak in August 1845 and the end of November 1845. The prices continued 
to decline until April 1850—a decrease of 57.5% (Campbell, 2014). Interestingly, due to 
the extensive construction of railway lines (approximately 6,123 miles of line by 1850), 
the returns on investments rapidly declined. The increased competition led to a decline of 
the dividend/par ration from 7% in 1847 to 2.4% by 1852 (Campbell, 2014). The collapse 
                                                          
2 The Bubble Act of 1720 was enacted following the crash of the South Sea Bubble. The main purpose of 
the Bubble Act was to restrict the trading of shares without the permission of the government and to 





of the Railway Mania is indicative of the detrimental effects of asset price bubbles on the 
economy as initial euphoric decisions lead to loss of future wealth.  
 The investigation of the Tulip Mania, South Sea Bubble and the Railway Mania 
reveal the primary catalysts of historical bubbles. Although these historical cases 
occurred in unique economic conditions, there are similar catalysts of bubbles presented 
in these case studies. First, due to the lack of a developed capital market, risky financial 
innovations act as a catalyst of historical bubbles. During the Tulip Mania, we witnessed 
the emergence of the futures market in the Netherlands, which incentivized the public to 
trade tulip options (Mackay, 1996). Furthermore, both during the South Sea Bubble and 
the Railway Mania, companies offered subscription shares to investors, which aided in 
the making the scheme more affordable for investors (Chang et al., 2016). Second, lax 
financial and commercial regulations act as a key catalyst in the formation of these 
historical bubbles. During the South Sea Bubble, “Bubbles” issued stock with promises 
of high returns but how high returns would be achieved, was never disclosed (Mackay, 
1996). In a similar manner, during the Railway Mania, the annulment of the Bubble Act 
of 1720 allowed railway companies to sell shares without the supervision of the 
government (McCarthy & Arnold, 2003). The analysis of early famous bubbles reveals 
that risky financial innovation and lax financial and commercial regulations act as key 









Section IV: Modern Bubbles 
 In contrast to the previous section, modern speculative asset price bubbles are 
quite complex in nature because these bubbles form within developed economies. 
Through the investigation of modern bubbles, we will understand how modern economic 
bubbles are similar/different than famous early bubbles. A comparison of modern and 
historical bubbles will assist in recognizing the leading indicators of a developed 
economy susceptible to speculative behavior.  
4.1: Japan’s Baburu Keiki (1980s)—Japan 
 After experiencing remarkable constant economic growth post-World War II, the 
Japanese entered a bubble economy in the late 1980s. Economists Hamada and Okada 
(2009) argue that the creation of Japan’s asset price bubble can be traced to Japan’s 
monetary and international policies, which created the perfect environment for a 
speculative bubble. More specifically, one of the primary catalysts of Japan’s bubble 
economy was the restrictive monetary policies set by Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto 
during the Plaza Accord in 1985 as an attempt to correct for the current account deficit in 
the United States. By devaluing the American dollar with respect to the Japanese Yen, the 
Japanese aided the U.S. reduce its national debt because America’s purchasing power 
was significantly less than Japan. However, the Japanese Yen became extremely 
overvalued in comparison to the American dollar, and this created a negative term of 
trade. The appreciation of the real exchange rate hurt the welfare of the Japanese 
economy by increasing the competitive conditions in Japanese industries for exports and 
imports (Hamada & Okada, 2009). To counteract the appreciating real exchange rate, 





Louvre Accords, Japan enacted a loose monetary policy which lowered the discount rate 
and provided the perfect financial conditions for speculative behavior in the Japanese 
economy (Hamada & Okada, 2009).  
 In addition to the relaxed monetary policy, the Japanese engaged in the financial 
liberalization of the banking sector during the 1980s which facilitated speculative 
behavior in the economy. Due to financial liberalization, banks became involved in more 
risky investments without being closely monitored by the government. Fukao (2003, 
p.368) states that “banks exclusively relied on collateral and paid little attention to the 
cash flow of underlying business.” Rather than reprimanding the actions of banks, many 
financial institutions were encouraged to engage in high-risk opportunities because the 
Bank of Japan followed the policy of “forgiveness and forbearance” when these financial 
institutions were in trouble (Cargill, Hutchinson, & Ito, 2000). For example, the Japanese 
keiretsu (lineage) system, a closely-knit grouping of commercial and financial 
institutions, engaged in risky activity during the period of deregulation. The companies 
within each keiretsu had an established bank managing the transfer of funds between the 
capital rich and capital poor commercial operations. The keiretsu were able to engage in 
risky activity during Japan’s deregulation, because it was widely known that the Japanese 
government would not allow such large institutions to fail. Also, bankruptcy was a rare 
occurrence within Japan’s large and most politically connected business firms because of 
the keiretsu system (Cargill & Parker, 2003). Financial liberalization created the perfect 
conditions for an asset price bubble, because firms and households were easily able to 





 Furthermore, tax distortions increased the customer-base of the banking sector for 
real estate loans and increased the value of land in Japan (Fukao, 2003). The inheritance 
tax in Japan until 1988 was 75% for over 500 million yen and over 70% for over 2 billion 
yen of inheritance. This high tax incentivized wealthy individuals to borrow money and 
buy land because the effective property tax rate on land was about 0.1% of the market 
value (Fukao, 2003). As the demand of land significantly increased, the price of land 
began to rise which as well led to less diversification of bank’s loan portfolios (Fukao, 
2003). 
  In the early 1990s, the burst of the Japanese asset price bubble occurred. The burst 
of the bubble had detrimental effects on the economy. After reaching its peak in 1989, the 
Nikkei 225 Index declined by over 50% during the following 18 months as demonstrated 
in FIGURE 1 above. As a result, land and real estate prices began to fall in 1991 and 





subsequent to the bubble economy is formally recognized as “Japan’s Lost Decade.” This 
period is characterized by long-lasting stagnation in real economic growth, and a 
tightened monetary policy as an attempt to re-establish the value of the yen. By the early 
2000s, Japan was gradually recovering from its recessionary period, but the Great 
Recession negatively impacted Japan’s ability to recover (Hamada & Okada, 2009).  
4.2: Dotcom Bubble (1995-2000)—United States 
 The Dotcom Bubble began in the mid-1990s, after the transition of the traditional 
business model from the brick-and-mortar company to the brick-and-click company due 
to the introduction of the World Wide Web. New excitement was created due to the 
unexplored potential of the internet in the world of commerce (Cassidy, 2002). 
Additionally, the success of early Dotcom companies such as Amazon facilitated the 
emergence of new companies that adopted Jeff Bezos’ model of Get Big Fast. The idea 
behind this model was very simple. Rather than pursing marginal growth, this strategy 
advocates for the use of aggressive tactics to capture the majority market share and to 
cultivate premier brand recognition in order to increase opportunities for customer 
acquisition and retention (Crain, 2014). For example, Amazon was spending 
unprecedented amounts of capital to alert people of its existence. For every $20 book 
Amazon sold, it was paying $16 to buy and ship each book, $8 in advertising and $1 in 
overhead, bringing its total cost per book to $25 (Cassidy, 2002). The combination of a 
new business model and the speculative potential of the Dotcom companies created new 
demand amongst investors and stockholders.  
 The speculative behavior of investors contributed to the overpricing of Dotcom 





invested capital into start-up companies by critically examining the profitability, business 
model, the reliability and the fundamental value of the company. However, venture 
capitalists during the Dotcom Bubble did not consider these measures. Driven by the idea 
that at least one of these companies would be the next EBay or Amazon, venture 
capitalists poured unprecedented amounts of capital into these Dotcom startups (Crain, 
2014). Annual venture capital investment grew from about $7 billion in 1995 to nearly 
$100 billion in 2000. From 1990 to 2000, while the number of dotcom companies grew 
from 1050 to 6420, the number of venture capital firms only doubled (Crain, 2014). The 
decision of venture capitalists to actively ignore available fundamental information gave 
rise to speculative behavior and acted as a catalyst of the Dotcom Bubble (Crain, 2014).  
   In comparison to previous asset price bubbles the expansion of the Dotcom 
Bubble was significantly influenced by herding behavior. A study conducted by Singh 
(2013) concluded that institutional investors invested into internet stock with high 
intensity during the rise in prices between December 1997 and March 2000. Singh (2013) 
used the Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny [LSV] measure of herding to measure the 
intensity of herding present during the Dotcom Bubble. For the overall period, Singh 
(2013) calculated the herding intensity of internet stocks as 6.58%. These results reveal 
that during the Dotcom Bubble investors were not acting independently. Rather, 
influenced by the actions of others, investors actively ignored fundamental information to 
gain possible riches.  
 Furthermore, one of the central factors that contributed to the development of the 
Dotcom Bubble was the actions of the Federal Reserve Bank. In order to understand the 





on the direct relationship between the Federal Reserve and the stock market. When the 
Federal Reserve cuts interest rates, stock prices go up. A fall in interest rates reduces the 
cost of borrowing, which allows firms and consumers to spend more on luxury goods and 
helps raise corporate earnings. Furthermore, as interest rates decrease, the P/E ratio of an 
asset increases which makes the perceived value of an asset higher in the eyes of an 
investor. On the other hand, an increase in interest rates by the Federal Reserve has the 
opposite effect on stock prices, cost of borrowing, spending and corporate earnings 
(Cassidy, 2002). Instead of increasing interest rates to counteract the effects of the initial 
boom period in the Dotcom Bubble, Greenspan chose not to act accordingly (Cassidy, 
2002). By deciding not to increase interest rates, Greenspan contributed to the rising 
share prices and the irrational development of the Dotcom Bubble.  
 The collapse of the Dotcom Bubble occurred in early 2000. Greenspan and the 





slowly impacted the internet shares in the stock market. As seen in FIGURE 2 above, 
since peaking on March 10, 2000, the NASDAQ had dropped 1,727 points, or 34%. The 
Dow Jones Composite Internet Index was down 53%. In a span of one week, $2 trillion 
of the stock market had disappeared (Cassidy, 2002). After the first hike in interest rates, 
investors began cautiously evaluating internet companies. Investors began to evaluate the 
dotcom companies with traditional measures of success such as P/E ratios. The shares of 
the dotcom companies were reaching an all-time low due to the absence of a sound 
business model, lack of business experience, and the tendency of companies to overspend 
on marketing and IT infrastructure (Razi, Tarn & Siddiqui, 2004). Greenspan’s decision 
to increase interest rates helped demonstrate the irrationality of investing in dotcom 
companies, and led to the collapse of the Dotcom Bubble.  
4.3: The Housing Bubble (1999-2010)—The United States  
 Shortly after the Dotcom Bubble, the U.S. underwent the largest financial crisis 
since the Great Depression. This financial crisis was triggered by a crash in the U.S. 
housing market, known as the ‘credit crunch’ (Chang et al., 2016). The rise of the U.S. 
Housing Bubble was caused by a conglomeration of economic policies. As noted by 
Gjerstad and Smith (2009), the expansion of the Housing Bubble was fueled by a wider 
availability of mortgage credit, which was facilitated by the U.S. expansionary monetary 
policy. The initial run-up in housing prices was triggered by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997, which led to an increase flow of capital to the housing market, causing an increase 
in demand, and a rapid increase in house prices (Gjerstad & Smith, 2009).  
In combination with the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, the Federal Reserve also 





Bubble in two ways. First, low short-term interest rates prompted the use of adjusted rate 
mortgages (ARMs). Potential home buyers who initially were unable to afford house 
payments under a fixed rate, could do so through ARMs. ARMs made monthly mortgage 
payments affordable for more buyers and therefore, encouraged the rising home prices 
(Holt, 2009). Second, the low short-term interest rates promoted housing by encouraging 
leveraging. Due to the low short-term interest rates, investors could increase their returns 
by borrowing at a low interest rate and then by investing in higher yielding long-term 
investments. Leveraging contributed to rising home prices by increasing the financing 
available for mortgage lending (Holt, 2009).  
 In addition to the expansionary monetary policy, the financial liberalization of 
the banking industry further expanded the U.S. Housing Bubble. Chang et al. (2016) 
points out that mortgage applicants were easily able to borrow credit for mortgages 
without serious credit checks. Under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1995, banks 
were required to increase their mortgage lending to low-income households so that there 
would be an increase in home-ownership rates. In order to adhere to these guidelines, 
many banks relaxed their standards for mortgage lending—reduced requirements for 
down payments and income (Holt, 2009).  
In addition to lax regulations, banks actively participated in the financial 
engineering of investment instruments. According to Chang (2011), the aim of financial 
engineering is to create specialized investment instruments to diversify funding 
instruments and aid in credit flow. During the U.S. Housing Bubble, banks lent 
significant amounts of funds to subprime mortgages via lending vehicles such as ARMs, 





mortgage obligations (CMOs) and mortgage backed securities (MBS) (Chang, 2011). The 
financial engineering of lending instruments helped accelerate the U.S. Housing Bubble 
because banks were encouraged to participate in risky lending practices. 
Soon after, the expanding U.S. Housing Bubble collapsed in 2007. Chang et al. 
(2016) accredits the collapse of the U.S. Housing Bubble to the risky investment 
practices by banks which led to numerous bank-runs. As a result of risky investment 
practices, there was an increasing rate of foreclosures. In comparison to 2006, the 
foreclosure rate increased by 75% in 2007 (Holt, 2009). A majority of these foreclosures 
consisted of subprime mortgages and ARMs. Banks found it increasingly difficult to 
resell mortgages. As this occurred simultaneously across banks in the nation, banks were 
forced to close and the loss of credit led to increasing debts (Chang et al., 2016). The 
effects of the financial crisis that persisted after the collapse of the U.S. Housing Bubble 
formally became recognized as the Great Recession. 
The review of Japan’s Baburu Keiki, the Dotcom Bubble and the U.S. Housing 
Bubble reveal the common catalysts of modern economic bubbles. In the more developed 
economies of the U.S. and Japan, a primary catalyst of speculative bubbles is an 
expansionary monetary policy. During Japan’s Baburu Keiki, Prime Minister Hashimoto 
enacted a loose monetary policy in order to counteract the appreciating real exchange rate 
of the Yen. As a result of his actions, the discount rate was significantly lowered and 
provided the perfect financial conditions for speculative behavior (Hamada & Okada, 
2009). Also, during the Dotcom Bubble, Alan Greenspan implemented an expansionary 
monetary policy by maintaining a low interest rate despite the rising share prices of 





dotcom companies due to the direct relationship between interest rates and stock prices 
(Cassidy, 2002). In addition to an expansionary monetary policy, the lack of government 
regulations acts as a key catalyst of modern bubbles because financial institutions are 
encouraged to engage in high-risk opportunities. This type of risk-taking behavior was 
seen during both Japan’s Baburu Keiki and the U.S. Housing Bubble, which significantly 
powered the development of the respective bubbles. The analysis of modern bubbles 
shows that the common catalysts of modern bubble are an expansionary monetary policy 




















Section V: Analysis of Bubbles—Catalysts and Drivers of a Bubble 
 Based on our historical cases, it is evident that there are many factors that act as 
catalysts and drivers in the formation of speculative bubbles. In this section, our primary 
aim will be to compile a list of catalysts, which are most common within our historical 
cases of bubbles. First, the most prominent catalyst in the formation of asset price 
bubbles is monetary expansion (Roy & Kemme, 2012).  
 During the Dutch Tulip Mania, monetary expansion acted as a primary catalyst in 
the formation of the asset price bubble because the introduction of tulip options allowed 
people to pay a small fraction of the bulbs’ price and bid on an option to buy. The tulip 
options assisted in making credit available in the market to varied income-leveled 
individuals, which encouraged the trade of options and increased the price of the tulip 
bulb in the market (Mackay, 1996). 
 From the three modern bubble case studies, a loose monetary policy is a key 
catalyst of each speculative bubble. During Japan’s Baburu Keiki, the expansionary 
monetary policy encouraged the severe escalation of asset and land prices. Prime 
Minister Hashimoto enacted a loose monetary policy to re-establish Japan’s exports to the 
U.S. after the devaluation of the Yen with respect to the U.S. dollar. The loose monetary 
policy lowered the discount rate and provided the perfect conditions for speculative 
behavior (Hamada & Okada, 2009). One of the primary catalysts in the Dotcom Bubble 
was the Reserve Bank’s decision to preserve a loose monetary policy despite the 
speculative behavior present in the market. The expansionary monetary policy sustained 
by Alan Greenspan contributed to the rising share prices due to the direct relationship 





example, also experienced monetary expansion which contributed to rising asset and land 
prices. Due to the low interest rates, banks used ARMs to encourage more prospective 
home buyers. Also, the low short-term interest rate promoted rising home prices through 
leveraging (Holt, 2009). The expansionary monetary policy fueled the U.S. Housing 
Bubble because as the demand for mortgages increased, home prices rose as well.  
  Another leading catalyst in the formation of speculative bubbles is lax financial 
and commercial regulations. In early asset price bubbles, this catalyst is seen when 
governments allowed companies to issue stock without requiring disclosures and policies 
that would protect investors. The primary example of such an occurrence is the South Sea 
Bubble. Under many circumstances, ‘Bubble’ companies issued stock with promises of 
high returns but how high returns would be achieved, was never disclosed (Mackay, 
1996). In a similar manner, during the Railway Mania, the annulment of the Bubble Act 
of 1720 allowed railway companies to sell shares without the supervision of the 
government (McCarthy & Arnold, 2003). The lack of government supervision 
encouraged risky investments because no governmental institution was protecting 
investors.  
 For modern speculative bubbles, Crotty (2009) reasons that New Financial 
Architecture (NFA), the integration of modern day financial markets with light to no 
government regulations, is the primary structural cause of asset price bubbles. In both the 
speculative asset bubbles of Japan and the U.S., the lack of financial and commercial 
regulation were leading contributors to the speculative behavior present in both 
economies. First, during Japan’s Baburu Keiki, many financial institutions were 





policy of “forgiveness and forbearance” when these financial institutions were in trouble 
(Cargill et al., 2000). Due to the support of the government and risky investment 
opportunities, financial liberalization created the perfect conditions for an asset price 
bubble in Japan.  
During the U.S. Housing Bubble, individuals without sufficient credit history 
were easily able to borrow credit for mortgages without serious credit checks (Chang et 
al., 2016). The relaxed standards for mortgage lending allowed individuals without 
sufficient funds to own homes. As the demand and ownership of homes continued to rise, 
the price of homes also increased. The lack of financial regulations allowed banks to 
engage in risky behavior which encouraged the development of the U.S. Housing Bubble. 
Through these case studies, it is evident that the government must play a key role in 
maintaining a stable economy. The government must employ certain policies that can 
regulate risky and irrational behavior in the market to prevent the development of asset 
price bubbles.  
  One final catalyst in the formation of bubbles is risky financial innovations (Roy 
& Kemme, 2012). Risky financial innovations were the key catalyst in early bubbles 
because in many cases, financial markets were not fully developed. During the South Sea 
Bubble, the South Sea Company sold company shares as subscription shares in order to 
make the scheme more appealing to investors. The subscription shares aided in the 
growing valuation of the company shares by making the scheme more affordable for 
investors (Chang et al., 2016). Similar to the South Sea Company, during the Railway 





innovation of subscription shares encouraged the participation of middle class families 
which increased the price of railway shares (Chang et al., 2016).  
 The U.S Housing Bubble is the most recent example that was triggered by risky 
financial innovations. In order to follow the regulations of the Community Reinvestment 
Act, banks participated in the financial engineering of investment instruments. Banks lent 
significant amounts of funds via financially innovated vehicles such as ARMs, CDOs, 
and CMOs (Chang, 2011). The financial engineering of lending instruments helped 
facilitate the development of the U.S. Housing Bubble by allowing people with 
insufficient credit or funds to own homes. Overall, risky financial innovations are a key 
catalyst for the formation of asset price bubbles, because it encourages the participation 

















Section VI: Bubble Development in Emerging Economies: China and India 
 In this section of the paper, we will be analyzing the possible existence of 
speculative bubbles in emerging economies. The primary focus of this section is on the 
emerging economies of China and India because while these countries play an integral 
role in the global economy, they are also experiencing unprecedented economic growth. 
This research is significant in the understanding of bubble development because the 
catalysts of bubbles in emerging economies may be different than developed economies. 
Therefore, this section of the paper will complete the anatomy of catalysts that promote 
the development of speculative bubbles.  
6.1: China’s Stock Market 
 Following the U.S. ‘credit crunch’, economists have shifted their focus to the 
volatility of China’s stock market. As of late, China has suffered from plummeting stock 
prices, which has had several international and domestic repercussions. As illustrated in 
FIGURE 3 below, in 2008 and 2011, the Shanghai Composite Index lost 70% and 22% of 
its value, respectively (Liang & Willett, 2015). This instability in China’s stock market 
has led to question whether China’s government can implement counteracting regulations 
and policies to protect against the effects of speculation and the resulting bubbles. As 
discussed early, in order to implement the correct policies and regulations, it is important 





 Although it is understandable that China’s stock market will suffer from some 
turbulence due to the lack of maturity, there is one factor that raises concern for 
speculative behavior and the possibility of a bubble in the stock market. That factor is the 
increasing flow of “hot money” in China’s economy (Guo & Huang, 2010). Hot money 
refers to the flow of speculative funds from one country to an international country in the 
hopes of earning a short-term profit. It is estimated that the aggregate hot money that 
flowed into China from 2003 to 2008 was approximately 104% of China’s total foreign 
exchange reserves (Guo & Huang, 2010).  
 The large influx of hot money has two main effects on China’s economy, which 
contributes to the development of a volatile stock market. First, the inflow of hot money 
influences a rise in property demand and in turn, drives prices up as well as market 





market which allowed foreign investors to make large sums of profit. Second, the 
presence of hot money created a great level of instability in the Chinese financial markets 
due to the nature of short-term investing (Guo & Huang, 2010).  
Because of the nature of short-term investing, asset prices in China exceeded their 
market fundamentals as investors continued to flood an already capital saturated market. 
The inflow of hot money fueled further deviation from fundamental values as there was a 
perception of a booming market. However, as soon as asset returns suggested that assets 
were overvalued, there was an instantaneous outflow of hot money before assets fell even 
more. As this cycle of inflow and outflow of hot money continues, China’s government 
has difficulty maintaining a stable market and in turn, this causes a rise in speculative 
behavior in the stock market and other markets such as real estate.  
6.2: China’s Housing Market 
 Unlike other developed economies, the Chinese economy has experienced rapid 
economic growth since the 1970s, with its GDP growing at a rate of 10% per year (Yao, 
Luo & Wang, 2014). This rapid economic growth has raised people’s standard of living 
and incomes exponentially, prompting a rise in demand for consumer goods and urban 
housing in particular. While a mild rise in prices and housing demand is normal for a 
country’s development, in the Chinese housing market prices are rising too rapidly which 
is making houses unaffordable for a vast majority of urban residents. The rapid increase 
in Chinese house prices is very similar to the magnitude observed during the U.S housing 
bubble. Tan and Wu (2014) find that the average growth rate of the Case-Shiller home 
price index between 1997 and 2006 was about 9.49% in the U.S. Meanwhile, the average 





the world financial crisis in 2008. This Chinese housing boom sparks the fear of another 
real estate bubble in a large economy, which can have detrimental effects on an economy 
slowly recovering from the Great Recession. In order to understand the source of this 
fear, it is important to evaluate the factors that are contributing to the increasing home 
prices of China and possibly creating a speculative bubble.  
 One of the primary reasons behind the increase in housing demand in China is the 
lack of a developed capital market. Developed economies such as the U.S. have easy 
access to investment instruments like stocks, bonds, and international financial assets 
which allow diversity in investment portfolios. Furthermore, in matured markets, these 
investment instruments are also more stable whereas in China, the stock market suffers 
from great levels of volatility (Guo & Huang, 2010; Liang, 2015). In China, the largest 
single component of a typical household’s asset portfolio is a housing asset. Reportedly, 
on average, a typical Chinese household’s housing asset accounts for almost 85% of a 
household’s nonfinancial wealth (Tan and Wu, 2014). The current financial situation of 
China is very similar to Japan during the bubble economy of the 1980s. After 
experiencing remarkable constant economic growth post- World War II, the Japanese 
entered into a bubble economy which was fueled by the increasing demand of land. As 
the demand of land increased, the price of land began to rise which as well led to less 
diversification of bank’s loan portfolios (Fukao, 2003). Drawing from the observations 
made during Japan’s Baburu Keiki, the lack of portfolio diversification in China is 
triggering an increase in house prices which is a sign of a bubble economy.  
 Another factor that is significantly impacting the rise in housing demand is the 





urban population is primarily due to the large influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the real-estate sector. As seen in FIGURE 4 below, China has consistently had a greater 
total inflow of FDI than both the U.S. and India. In 2000, real-estate development made 
up 8% of China’s total FDI inflow. By 2011, real-estate development accounted for 23% 
of China’s total FDI inflow. That is, a percent change of approximately 187.50% from 
2000-2011 (Yao, Luo & Wang, 2014). As a result of the increase in FDI inflow, China’s 
rural population has migrated to urban cities in search of new employment opportunities. 
However, at the same time, there is a lack of low-rent housing available for rural workers. 
The low availability of affordable homes for rural workers is primarily due to the fact that 
Chinese developers are able to earn a higher investment return by selling more expensive 
homes than low-rent homes (Yao, Luo & Wang, 2014). Therefore, the profit-earning 
incentive of developers and the growing demand for houses contributes significantly to 





In addition to China’s lack of investment channels and rapid urbanization, the 
Chinese government has also implemented an expansionary monetary policy which has 
influenced the rise of home prices. Prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) initiated by 
the U.S. housing bubble in 2008, China’s monetary policy was best described as being 
very conservative. However, in an effort to avoid a potential economic downturn caused 
by the GFC, the Chinese government employed a loose monetary policy by increasing the 
money supply and greatly relaxing credit conditions (Chiang, 2016). Referring back to 
Japan’s Baburu Keiki, Prime Minister Hashimoto had enacted a loose monetary policy to 
re-establish Japan’s exports to the U.S. after the devaluation of the Yen with respect to 
the U.S. dollar. The loose monetary policy lowered the discount rate and provided the 
perfect conditions for speculative behavior, encouraging a severe escalation of asset and 
land prices (Hamada & Okada, 2009). Currently, due to its expansionary monetary 
policy, China is also experiencing a similar situation as Japan. Although the expansionary 
monetary policy has assisted the Chinese economy avoid a deep recession, it has also 
caused high inflation and a heated urban housing market (Chiang, 2016). Rather than 
stabilizing the Chinese economy, the loose monetary policy has triggered an increase in 
home prices which is adding to the development of a possible speculative bubble.  
 The presence of rapid urbanization, an expansionary monetary policy and an 
underdeveloped capital market hints at the fact that China is amid a real estate bubble of 
its own. If adequate measures are not taken by the Chinese government to control the 
rising home prices, then we may be suffering from another severe global recession. 
 





6.3: India’s Property Bubble 
 Following China’s housing bubble, another prime concern of economists and 
policymakers is the potential property bubble blooming in India. Unlike developed 
economies, emerging economies such as India and China, are undergoing rapid economic 
growth which has created volatile markets. FIGURE 5 below provides a comparative 
illustration of the annual GDP growth rate of the U.S., China and India. As seen in 
FIGURE 5, China and India have been economically growing at a rapid pace. On the 
other hand, the U.S. has maintained an annual GDP growth rate approximately equivalent 
to 2% since 2001. As of 2015, while maintaining an annual population growth rate of 
1.2%, India was also experiencing an annual GDP growth rate of 7.6%. This rapid 
economic growth and steady growth in population has simultaneously raised the standard 
of living and income in India, but has also prompted a rise in demand for consumer goods 
and urban housing. While a mild rise in housing prices is sustainable, India’s rising 
housing prices are predominately concentrated in metropolitan areas like Mumbai, New 
Delhi and Bengaluru, which gives rise to speculative behavior (Singh, 2014). In 2006, 
Himanshu Joshi (2006), director of Reserve Bank of India, reported that India’s real 
estate market was recording an annual price appreciation of 10% or more. While the 





bubble in the emerging economies of both India and China sparks the fear of deepening 
the recessionary state of countries around the globe.   
One of the primary factors that is currently influencing the rise in housing demand 
is India’s rapid urbanization. In 2006, the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act was 
repealed by the central government. The Urban Land Act encouraged an investment 
climate because the act allowed for easy foreclosures and granted permission for FDI to 
make investments in the real estate market. FIGURE 4 on pg. 41 illustrates the direct 
impact of the Urban Land Act in India. From 2005 to 2006, FDI inflow increased by 
142.2%. Because of the increase in FDI inflows, India has exponentially seen a rise in job 
opportunities in urban areas (Joshi, 2006). Reportedly, in 1901, urbanization in India was 
only 11%. However, by 2011, urbanization increased to 31% and it is expected to reach 
41% by 2030 (Singh, 2014). Although urbanization is a sign of economic growth and 





lack of affordable housing available to low-earning workers because Indian developers 
can earn a higher investment return by selling more luxury homes. Due to this scarcity, 
there has been a substantial rise in the home prices of metropolitan areas, some even 
exceeding prices in Tokyo and London (Gopalan & Venkataraman, 2015; Singh, 2014).  
 In addition to India’s heated investment climate, India also maintains an 
expansionary monetary policy characterized by low interest rates and relaxed credit 
conditions (Singh, 2014). As mentioned before, an expansionary monetary policy fuels 
the speculative behavior of market participants, because of the relative ease of borrowing 
capital. Referring to the U.S. housing bubble, due to the low interest rates, banks 
encouraged prospective home buyers to purchase homes through new financial 
innovations such as ARMs and CDOs (Holt, 2009). In a similar way, under these low 
interest rate conditions, India has developed new financial innovations, such as the 
Mortgage Risk Guarantee Funds which provide default guarantee for housing loans up to 
5 lakhs rupees without any collateral for security, to incentivize prospective home buyers 
(Singh, 2014). Fueled by the expansionary monetary policy, the relative demand of 
houses in Indian metropolitan areas continue to rise and in turn, so does the price of 
homes.  
 In most recent news, in late 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi implemented a 
demonetization plan in order to curb the use of “black money”. Black money refers to 
money obtained through illegal activity and it is used to evade taxes and other regulatory 
policies. As a part of Modi’s demonetization plan, Modi attempted to directly impact the 
use of black money in the real estate sector, where an estimated 30% of all transactions 





use of the 500 and 1000 rupee note but allowed individual to make bank deposits to 
convert the notes into new currency. Although the aim of the demonetization policy was 
to counteract the use of black money in the real estate sector, this policy has also 
contributed to the lowering of interest rates (Dasgupta, 2016). In this specific case, we 
see two factors directly impacting the price of homes. First, the large exodus of black 
money can possibly cause a sharp correction in real estate prices. Second, the further 
decrease in interest rates can incentivize more demand in the real estate sector due to the 
lower cost of borrowing. Hence, in the long-run, Modi’s demonetization plan will have a 
strong impact on the demand and price of homes in India.  
 With this recent plan of demonetization, it is important to focus on the 
development of the property bubble in India. As a rise in home prices will perhaps induce 
more speculative behavior in the market. On the other hand, a burst of the property 
bubble will have severe implications for the economic state of India and the global 
economy.  
 The investigation of potential bubble forming markets of the emerging economies 
of China and India demonstrate that the key catalysts of bubbles in emerging economies 
differ from developed economies. Although the existence of an expansionary monetary 
policy contributes to the speculative behavior in these markets, China and India 
experience unique economic conditions, which are simulating the creation of a housing 
bubble. First, the rapid urbanization of both countries has significantly increased the 
inflow of FDI. Due to this new investment climate, there is an increased demand for 
housing in urban areas, but a lack of adequate low-renting housing being developed. 





hot money and black money, which has impacted the rise of housing demand. The inflow 
of hot money and black money in China and India increases housing demand, because 
this inflow creates a perception of a booming market. The presence of an expansionary 
monetary policy, rapid urbanization and volatile markets with rising home prices hints at 























Section VII: Testing for Bubbles 
This section aims to construct a model to test for the existence of asset price 
bubbles in the housing industry of the United States from 1977-2016. We formulate the 
model based on the theoretical framework of bubble development discussed in section II 
and the analysis of bubbles conducted in sections III and IV.  
7.1: Explanation of Bubble Detection Model 
 According to the theoretical explanation of bubble formation, the valuation of an 
asset is not only determined by a market participant’s valuation of an asset based on 
economic fundamentals, but also is reflective of the market participant’s speculative 
behavior. The difference between the market price and the economic fundamentals is 
called a bubble (Flood & Garber, 1980; Li & Chand, 2015; Tirole, 1982). In simple 
terms, a bubble arises when the valuation of an asset deviates from fundamental value.  
In addition to the relationship between bubbles and economic fundamentals, 
behavioral finance proposes that psychological forces influence investor behavior which 
contributes to the development of speculative bubbles. As explained before, within the 
field of behavioral finance, the “positive feedback” approach is a central idea behind the 
formation of speculative bubbles. An important component of the positive feedback 
trading is the trend chasing behavior of traders, which is facilitated by their tendency to 
make trading decisions based on extrapolated trends of past price changes (De Long et 
al., 1990; Shiller, 2002). If the trend chasing agents’ extrapolated trends are validated by 
rising fundamentals, agents are likely to transpose their short trend horizons to longer 
trend horizons and therefore, sustain rising prices and a bubble that is not justified by 





 Based on the theoretical explanation of bubble development, it is evident that the 
two variables of economic fundamentals and past price behavior play a key role in the 
development of speculative bubbles. Hence, the model constructed to detect the existence 
of bubbles in the housing industry of the United States from 1977-2016 incorporates 
these two variables. Equation 1 below presents the model by which the relationship 
between fundamental indicators and past price changes will be tested to detect bubbles in 
the U.S. economy:  
%∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = %∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠 + %∆𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 (1) 
Economic fundamentals are defined as the discounted future cash flows from an 
asset based on the rational expectation of that asset’s performance (Li & Chand, 2015; 
Tirole, 1982). However, the true value of economic fundamentals is difficult to determine 
due to the uncertainty of two unknown variables—the rational expectation of an asset’s 
performance and the discount to apply to the future cash flows (Tirole, 1982). Although 
the true value of economic fundamentals is difficult to determine, economists model the 
value of economic fundamental through proxy variables.  
While researching the relationship between market fundamentals and house price 
inflation in Beijing, Qiang Li and Satish Chand (2015) regressed housing prices on three 
proxy market fundamentals—urban disposable income, the number of population and 
housing vacancy area. As a result of Li and Chand’s research, market fundamentals 
explained approximately 60% of the observed variation of housing prices in Beijing from 
2006 to 2011. Ren, Xiong and Yuan (2012) regressed housing prices on GDP growth 





major cities in China. Ren, Xiong and Yuan (2012) find that there are no rational bubbles 
in the Chinese housing market. 
The market fundamentals employed by the researchers stated above demonstrate a 
relationship between the proxy fundamental variables and the change of house prices. For 
example, it is logical to assume that higher interest rates tend to lower housing prices 
because the cost of borrowing increases. Since the cost of borrowing is higher, home 
buyers are less likely to demand homes and in turn, this would lower the prices of houses. 
Therefore, interest rates and housing prices share a negative relationship. Furthermore, 
many of the market fundamentals used by Li and Chand (2015) and Ren et al. (2012) 
reflect the regional factors that might influence housing prices such as “population” in 
China. As shown by these researchers, it is important that market fundamentals capture 
the regional variables that influence changes in house prices.  
The model constructed in this research uses interest rate, inflation rate and the 
personal income of the states and districts in the U.S. as proxy variables to determine the 
fundamental value of houses in the U.S. during 1977-2016. By replacing fundamentals 
with the proxy variables in equation 1, the following model results:   
%∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 + %∆𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟    (2) 
As explained before by the positive feedback approach, market agents make 
trading decisions based on past price changes. In one model of speculative bubbles, 
Shiller (2002) concludes that demand for assets depends on a distributed lag of past 
returns. According to this model, demand increases by past returns if the high returns 
came in the past few months, and demand increases less if the high returns did not come 





variable can be described by a distributed lag of five periods [one period=one quarter of a 




) = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖𝑡−2
) + 𝛽2 ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡−2
𝑃𝑖𝑡−3
) + 𝛽3 ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡−2
𝑃𝑖𝑡−3
)         
 
          + 𝛽4 ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡−4
𝑃𝑖𝑡−5
)             (3)  
 
Using the pooled regression technique, we can test the relationship explained by 
equation 3. However, to more accurately calculate the percent change between each 
period, it is important to take the natural log of the distributed lags. By taking the natural 
log of the %∆Price and the components that represent past price change, we can interpret 
a direct relationship between ß1, ß2, ß3, and ß4 and %∆Price. Therefore, the relationship 
between %∆Price and ß1, ß2, ß3, and ß4 can be interpreted as an elasticity.  
In equation 3, “𝛼𝑖𝑡” represents the percent price change of houses in the initial 
time period of 1977Q1, while the subscript “𝑖𝑡"is the indicative of the state of the variable 
during a specified period of time. The variable “𝑃” is the quarterly price index of houses 
in the U.S. from 1977-2016. “𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇” represents the interest rate of the specified quarter 
and “𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹” is the inflation rate for the stated quarter. The variable “𝐷𝑅𝑃𝐼” is the 
quarterly personal income of the fifty states and districts in the United States. The “𝛼” 
coefficients represent the estimators of the fundamental proxy indicators and the “𝛽" 
coefficient are the estimators of past price changes. 
 The model described in equation 3 tests the relationship between fundamental 






Using the pooled regression technique, the model will evaluate the following null 
and alternative hypotheses: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 = 0 
𝐻𝑎: ∑ 𝛽 > 0 
Based on the statistical significance of the exogenous variables defined by the “𝛽” 
coefficient, the rejection of the null hypothesis will propose that statistical evidence 
suggests that the price deviation from fundamental values is due to the possible existence 
of an asset price bubble in United States. Therefore, we will accept the alternative 
hypothesis as described above. However, if the exogenous variables defined by the “𝛽” 
coefficient are not statistically significant, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Thus, we cannot propose that statistical evidence supports the conclusion that an asset 
price bubble existed in the United States in the given time period.  
7.2: Explanation of Data 
 The housing data used in this paper are quarterly and cover the time period from 
1977 quarter 1(January-March) to 2016 quarter 4 (October-December) from the United 
States. Table 1 shows the summary statistics on each of the variables used in the analysis 










TABLE 1: Summary of Data 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Observations 
DRHP 0.0031 0.7972 -0.5537 0.0306 8160 
DINT 0.0003 0.0161 -0.2150 0.0050 8160 
DINF -0.0002 0.0073 -0.0110 0.0030 8160 
DRPI 0.0007 0.1579  -0.1575 0.0133 8160 
DRHP1 0.0030 0.7972 -0.5537 0.0309 8160 
DRHP2 0.0030 0.7972 -0.5537 0.0314 8160 
DRHP3 0.0031 0.7972 -0.5537 0.0317 8160 
DRHP4 0.0031 0.7972 -0.5537 0.0320 8160 
 DINT is the change in real 30-year fixed mortgage rate in the U.S., computed as 
the three-month average of weekly data. The data are compiled by the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Economic Databank. It is one of the largest institutions in the U.S responsible for 
advising the Bank President on matter of economic policy (Freddie Mac, 2016).  
 DINF is the change in quarterly national inflation rate. The quarterly inflation rate 
is calculated by computing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator using the 
following formula: 
𝜋 = ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡) − ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡−4) 
The GDP deflator is computed using the nominal and real value of GDP, which is 





 DRPI is the change in real quarterly personal income of the fifty states in the U.S. 
The information regarding this data is collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2016). 
 DRHP1, DRHP2, DRHP3, and DRHP4 are the lagged distribution variables of 
the change in the real quarterly price index of houses. The base date is the first quarter of 
1980, when the index is set to 100. DRHP represents the real percent price change 
between the current time period and the previous quarter. The quarterly price index of 
houses is collected from the website of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (2016).  
 Overall, this data can be best described as pooled cross section data, because the 
sample is collected randomly from a large population independently of each other at 
different points in time.   
7.3: Results 
 Rather than using a simple regression technique, this study utilizes pooled 
regression with fixed effects to capture the relationship between the explanatory variables 
and the present price change. Per definition, the fixed effects model is useful while 
dealing with pooled cross section data because it fixes all unobserved, time-constant 
factors that affect present price change overtime. By regressing DRHP on DINT, DINF, 
DRPI, DRHP1, DRHP2, DRHP3, and DRHP4, we can observe the results presented in 














T Ratio  
(8102 DF) 
DINT -0.63361 0.06696 -9.46 
DINF -0.17858 0.11161 1.60 
DRPI 0.23366 0.02500 9.35 
DRHP1 -0.16607 0.01083 -15.34 
DRHP2 0.09758 0.01696 9.12 
DRHP3 0.15653 0.01063 14.73 
DRHP4 0.15430 0.01025 14.69 
R2 = 0.0962 
The R2 value reported above indicates the percentage of the variance in the dependent 
variable that is explained by the model being tested. In this specific case, 9.62% of the 
variance in present price change (DRHP) is being explained by the estimated model. 
Additionally, in terms of the proxy fundamental variables in the model, it is predicted by 
the model that real interest rates and real personal income are statistically significant 
explanatory variables in determining the present price change in the U.S. housing market. 
According to the model, all other factors being constant, an increase of 1% in real interest 
rates will decrease the present price change by 0.37%. Also, an increase of 1% in 
personal income will increase the present price change by 1.23%. These results are 
complementary to economic theory, which suggests that an increase in interest rates will 
decrease housing demand and house prices due to the high cost of borrowing. Also, 
economic theory supports the idea that an increase in personal income should increase 
housing demand and in turn, increase house prices because of the larger availability of 
wealth (Li & Chand, 2015; Ren, Xiang & Yuan, 2012). This model also suggests that 





in the model. That is, an increase in DRHP1 by 1% causes present price change to 
decrease by .83%. On the hand, an increase in DRHP2 by 1% prompts a positive change 
in present price change by 1.10%. Similarly, an increase in DRHP3 by 1% will increase 
present price change by 1.16%. Also, an increase in DRHP4 by 1% will increase present 
price change by 1.15%. As a result, this model suggests that the overall relationship 
between present price change and past price behavior is positive. Overall, due to this 
model, we can predict that present price change is influenced by both fundamentals and 
past price behavior.  
 However, this model also reveals that the fundamental indicator of “DINF” is not 
statistically different than zero. Although a negative relationship between DINF and 
present price change is understandable because higher inflation results in higher real 
interest rates which increases the cost of borrowing, the model suggests that inflation is 
not a statistically significant determinant of present price changes. However, these results 
support the conclusions drawn by Shiller (2002). According to Shiller (2002), demand for 
assets depends on a distributed lag of past returns. Demand increases by past returns if 
the high return came in the past few months, and demand increases less if the high returns 
did not come in the past few months. The model presented in Table 2 suggests that all 
variables that describe past price changes are statistically significant in explaining the 
variation in present price change.  
 We also tested the isolated significance of fundamentals and past price behavior 
on present price changes. Using the F-test, the following two set of null and alternative 






Hypothesis Set 1 
𝐻0: 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹 = 𝐷𝑅𝑃𝐼 = 0 
𝐻𝑎: 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇 ≠ 0; 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹 ≠ 0; 𝐷𝑅𝑃𝐼 ≠ 0 
Hypothesis Set 2 
𝐻0: 𝐷𝑅𝐻𝑃1 = 𝐷𝑅𝐻𝑃2 = 𝐷𝑅𝐻𝑃3 = 𝐷𝑅𝐻𝑃4 = 0 
𝐻𝑎: 𝐷𝑅𝐻𝑃1 ≠ 0; 𝐷𝑅𝐻𝑃2 ≠ 0; 𝐷𝑅𝐻𝑃3 ≠ 0; 𝐷𝑅𝐻𝑃4 ≠ 0 
The null hypothesis in hypothesis set 1 tests whether the fundamental indicators in the 
model are statistically different than zero. By rejecting the null hypothesis, we will be 
able to conclude that statistical evidence supports the argument that inflation, interest 
rates and personal income are significant variables in determining the present price 
change. In hypothesis set 2, the null hypothesis evaluates whether past price behavior is a 
statistically significant component in explaining the variation in present price change. A 
rejection of the null hypothesis will support the conclusion that past price changes are 
statistically different than zero and are significant explanatory variables in explaining the 
variation in present price change. By testing these null hypotheses using a F-test, the 
following results are obtained:  
TABLE 3: F-Test Output 
Hypothesis Set 1 Results: 
F-statistic 55.80 
Hypothesis Set 2 Results: 
F-statistic 160.20 
As indicated by the results in Table 3, both the F-statistic very strongly reject the null 
hypotheses in sets 1 and 2. A rejection of the null hypotheses supports the claim that 





to some extent help resolve the previous raised concerns as they suggest that another 
factor is impacting the significance of inflation in the model. Since statistical evidence 
supports the claim that both past price behavior and fundamentals influence the 
fluctuation of present price change, another question that arises is which component has a 
greater impact on present price change? 
 In order to evaluate this question, we also test the following hypothesis: 
H0: DRHP1 + DRHP2 + DRHP3 + DRHP4= 1 
Based on the results of this test, we will be able to state by what percentage fundamentals 
and past price behavior influence present price change. By testing the null hypothesis 
stated above using a F-test, the following results are observed: 
TABLE 4: Determining the Influence of Fundamentals and Past Price Behavior 
Test Value 
STD. Error of 
Test Value 
T-Statistic F-Statistic P-Value 
-0.376 0.0161 -23.307 543.226 0.000 
As demonstrated by the results in Table 4, past price behavior accounts for 62.4% of the 
variation in present price change, whereas fundamentals account for 37.6% of the 
fluctuation in present price change. While the results of this test imply that both past price 
behavior and fundamentals impact the variation of present price change, past price 
behavior has a stronger impact on the variation of present price change.  
 Due to these results, we can conclude that the valuation of assets in the U.S. 
housing market from 1977-2016 were primarily based on past price behavior rather than 
fundamentals. As explained before, a bubble is created when the valuation of an asset 
deviates from fundamental value (Flood & Garber, 1980; Li & Chand, 2015; Tirole, 





conducted by market participants which can arise due to past price behavior (De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990; Shiller, 2002). Therefore, based on the definition 
of bubbles and the results of the statistical analysis presented above, we conclude that the 
U.S. housing market from 1977-2016 fueled a bubble economy. As we evaluated this 
conclusion based on historical evidence, this model is validated by the fact that the 
United States experienced a housing bubble in the early 2000s which led to the Global 





















Section VIII: Conclusion 
 As the study of these historical speculative bubbles have shown, bubbles are 
primarily driven by the speculative actions of market participants. It is the speculative 
behavior of market participants that causes the development of bubbles. However, the 
rise of speculative behavior in each market is triggered by varying market conditions. The 
investigation of the historical bubbles has provided contextual clues to the actual creation 
and propagation of asset bubbles. While the study of historical bubbles in developed 
economies shows that an expansionary monetary policy, lax financial and commercial 
regulations, New Financial Architecture and risky financial innovations are the key 
catalysts of speculative bubbles, these catalysts are not entirely true for emerging 
economies.  
 This paper finds that the emerging economies of China and India maybe facing a 
potential housing bubble in their respective economies. Although the presence of an 
expansionary monetary policy contributes to the speculative behavior in these markets, 
China and India face unique conditions which are stimulating the creation of a housing 
bubble. First, the rapid urbanization of both countries has significantly increased the 
inflow of FDI. As a result, there is a new-found demand for housing in urban areas, but a 
lack of adequate low-renting homes being developed. Second, the underdeveloped capital 
markets of China and India facilitate the inflow of hot money and black money in the 
market, which creates a false perception of a booming market. In reality, the inflow of hot 
money and black money creates volatility in the market, because an outflow of hot 
money and black money will cause the market to crash as market participants will exit 





monetary policy, rapid urbanization and volatile markets with rising home prices hints at 
the potential housing bubbles in China and India. If adequate measures are not taken by 
both countries to control the exponentially rising home prices, then the burst of another 
housing bubble will have severe implications for the global economy.  
 Lastly, we modeled the housing market of the U.S. from 1977-2016 to identify a 
bubble economy during this time period. This model tested the relationship between 
present price changes, proxy fundamental indicators and past price changes. Based on the 
results of the pooled regression and F-tests, it was concluded that past price changes 
accounted for 62.4% of the variation in the present price change of homes in the U.S. 
With the support of theoretical and statistical evidence, the results of this paper suggest 
that the U.S. housing prices between 1977-2016 deviate from fundamental value and are 
based on the speculative behavior of market participants.  
 Adding to existing literature, this paper provides statistical and theoretical 
evidence to show that the past price behavior of market participants is another catalyst 
which contributes to the development of speculative asset price bubbles. While extensive 
research has been conducted to understand the creation and propagation of speculative 
bubbles in developed economies, literature still needs to perform detailed studies on the 
development of bubbles in emerging economies. Future research can test the presence of 
past price behavior in the emerging economies of China and India to evaluate whether 
this indicator plays a role in the formation of the present housing bubble. Based on the 
analysis of this paper, future research will be able to contribute to the understanding of 





emerging economies. In our globalized economy, this research will be significant because 
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